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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
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Plaintiff/Respondent,

:
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:

APRIL GARZA,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No.

Priority No. 13

:

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ARGUMENT
Petitioner appears to present several questions in her
petition.

However, in her argument she only contests the court

of appeals' conclusion that she did not provide an adequate
record on review because she did not provide a transcript of the
hearing on her motion to suppress. A brief review of the
appellate chronology of this case will demonstrate that the court
of appeals ruled correctly.
On August 3, 1990, petitioner timely filed a notice of
appeal from her conviction of possession of equipment with intent
to manufacture a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-8(l)(b) (1990), and one
count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-201 and 5837-8 (1990) (R. 207).l
1

On December 3, 1990, petitioner filed a

Petitioner apparently entered a conditional guilty plea to
the two counts after the denial of her motion to suppress in
accordance with State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).

certification that a trial transcript was not needed on appeal
(R. 222). On or about December 4, 1990, petitioner filed her
opening brief.

The State filed its brief on February 13, 1991.

The court of appeals received a transcript of the suppression
hearing on March 1, 1991, two weeks after the State's brief was
due and filed (see letter attached hereto in the Addendum).
Petitioner never sought to produce a transcript of her
guilty plea hearing.

She produced a transcript of the

suppression hearing after both petitioner's and the State's
briefs had been filed.

Therefore, neither petitioner nor the

State were able to use the hearing transcript in briefing this
case.

Petitioner's assertion that the transcript had been

properly presented to the court of appeals misstates the facts of
this case and should be rejected (Petition at 2; see petition's
exhibit "C").

The court of appeals properly found that

petitioner had not provided the transcript for the purposes of
this appeal.

State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah App. 1991).

Therefore, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

However, she did not produce a transcript of the guilty plea
hearing, and the statement she signed prior to entering the plea
did not fully comport with the conditional plea requirements of
Serv. Therefore, the conditional plea could not be verified. The
court of appeals noted that deficiency and reiterated the
importance of providing a record to verify the entry of a
conditional plea. State v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937, 938-9 (Utah App.
1991).
2
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In Re:
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Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Case No. 900562-CA
April Garza,
Defendant and Appellant.
Dear Mr. Zabriskie:
This letter is to advise you that on March 1, 1991, a
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member or organ; and her bodily injury
did not create a substantial risk of death.
Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1218-19. The court
affirmed his conviction, however, finding
that the victim "suffered physical pain that
is precisely the type of 'physical injury'
contemplated by the statute." Peterson,
681 P.2d at 1219. See also State v. Young,
559 P.2d 541, 542 (Utah 1977) (requisite
physical injury present where defendant's
blow to victim's face momentarily stunned
victim).
[3] Defendant attempts to distinguish
Peterson and Young by contending that
Mr. Carly sustained no bodily injury at all
while he and Mr. Carly fought in the Carly
home prior to the entrance of the other two
assailants. The record does not support
defendant's argument Mr. Carly testified
that after defendant struck him in the
mouth with a closed fist, knocking him off
balance, he could taste blood inside his
mouth. Defendant continued to attack Mr.
Carly with his fists such that Mr. Carly
was forced to restrain defendant in a headlock. Moreover, Deputy Reed Parkin of
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, who
investigated the disturbance at the Carly
home, testified that Mr. Carly had sustained significant "trauma" to his face.
According to Parkin, Mr. Carly's lips were
swollen, and there was a pinkish color
around his teeth, making it evident that he
had been bleeding.11
Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a
reasonable jury could have found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that defendant caused
"bodily injury" to Mr. Carly as contemplated by the statute. Therefore, we affirm defendant's conviction for aggravated
burglary.
15. Defendant contends that even if Mr. Carly's
dizziness is a statutorily-recognized "bodily injury," he is not liable because another assailant
caused the dizziness by pushing Mr. Carly
against the kitchen sink. This argument is without merit. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (Supp.
1988) clearly provides that the injury may be
perpetrated by "the actor or another participant
in the crime." Id Furthermore, Utah Code

CONCLUSION
h
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for aggravated burglary. We hold that
Mrs. Carly's courtroom behavior did not
deny defendant a fair trial. Furthermore,
there is sufficient evidence that defendant
caused "bodily injury" to uphold his conviction
of
aggravated burglary under Utah
Code
Ann
- § 76-6-203 (Supp.1988).
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
f.

April GARZA, Defendant and Appellant
No. 900562-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 7, 1991.

Defendant entered plea after the
Fourth District Court, Utah County,
George E. Ballif, J., denied her motion to
suppress certain evidence. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,
held that Court would not review issue of
propriety of denial of motion to suppress
where defendant did not take issue with
trial court's findings of fact and failed to
provide transcript of hearing on motion to
suppress.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., filed concurring opinion.
Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) states: "Every person,
acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits
the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a part> for
such conduct."

938

Utah

820 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

1. Criminal Law <*=>1144.12
Court of Appeals was to assume correctness of denial of motion to suppress
where defendant did not take issue with
trial court's findings of fact and failed to
provide court with transcript of hearing;
failure to provide transcript made it impossible to even verify that conditional plea,
that would allow appeal, was even properly
entered.
2. Criminal Law **1026.1<K5)
Court of Appeals reviews rulings on
preplea motions to suppress only when
such plea, entered with consent of prosecution and accepted by trial judge, specifically preserves suppression issue for appeal,
and Court of Appeals allows withdrawal of
plea if defendant's arguments in favor of
suppression are accepted.
3. Criminal Law e»U19(2), 1130(3, 5)
Court of Appeal's decision not to consider merits of defendant's issues on appeal
for failure to provide transcript of suppression hearing was bolstered by defendant's
failure to include statement of facts in
brief, as required by appellate rul^s, or to
include citations to record in brief, which
were grounds to refuse to reach issues.
Rules App.Proc., Rule 24(aX7).
Dean N. Zabriskie, Provo, for defendant
and appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H. Atherton, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Before JACKSON, ORME and RUSSON,
JJ.
JACKSON, Judge:
Defendant April Garza appeals from the
trial court's denial of her motion to suppress certain evidence. We affirm.
Defendant asserts in conclusory terms
that both the warrantless search of her
vehicle and the warrant search of her residence violated her constitutional rights to
be free from illegal searches and seizures.
[1] Defendant has not taken issue with
the trial court's findings of fact and has

failed to provide this court with a transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress, therefore, we must assume, as a
matter of law, that the trial court's decision
to deny that motion, was not erroneous.
See Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150
(Utah 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1033,
110 S.Ct 751,107 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990) (court
assumes regularity of proceedings below
where appellant faQs to provide adequate
record on appeal) (citing State v. Miller,
718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); State v.
Bobbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985);
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah
1982)). See also State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d
252, 253 (Utah 1983) (court assumes correctness of judgment below if counsel on
appeal fails to cite to record); State v.
Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982)
(court assumes correctness of findings
when defendant's brief contained nothing
more than defendant's version of facts
found by trial court).
[2] While this may seem like a harsh
result, we cannot, review the proceedings
below without an adequate record. Defendant's failure to provide us with a transcript makes it impossible for us, for example, even to verify that a conditional plea
was properly entered, as defendant contends. In State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935
(Utah App.1988), this court acknowledged
that the use of conditional guilty pleas by
criminal defendants was a sound and sensible practice, "if agreed to by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court" Id,
at 938 (emphasis added). We review rulings on pre-plea motions to suppress only
when such a plea "entered by the defendant with the consent of the prosecution
and accepted by the trial judge specifically
preserves the suppression issue for appeal
and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant's arguments in favor of suppression
are accepted by the appellate court[.]" Id.
In State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App.
1990), this court stated that "[a] defendant
seeking appellate review pursuant to a conditional plea bears the burden of demonstrating that the conditional nature of the
plea is unambiguously established in the

STATE v. GARZA
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trial court record." Id. at 1271 (citations
omitted).
[3] In this case, because defendant has
pot supplied us with the requisite record,
ire do not review the denial of her motion
lo suppress. Our decision not to consider
the merits of defendant's issues on appeal
g further bolstered by the fact that she
failed to include a statement of facts in her
brief, as required by Rule 24(a)(7) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Neither does defendant's brief contain any citations to the record. In Demetropoulos v.
Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App.)
(Jackson, J., concurring), cert denied, 765
p.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), the author of this
opinion commented that "[t]he time will
most assuredly arrive when a panel of this
court will be constrained to disregard intolerable and unacceptable briefs and not
reach the merits of the case/' Id In
English v. Standard Optical, 814 P.2d
613, 618-19 (Utah App,1991), we overcame
any trepidation that may have been present
about declining to rea£h an issue and made
clear that when an appellant's argument
contains no citations to the record and no
legal authority, and as such does not comply with briefing rules, we would decline to
reach those issues.1
The trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress is affirmed.
RUSSON, J., concurs.
ORME, Judge (concurring):
I concur in the court's opinion. I write
separately because this is a criminal case,
and I believe in such cases we should be
somewhat less fastidious in insisting upon
compliance with technical requirements as
a condition to reaching the merits. I would
not be comfortable denying a criminal defendant any meaningful exercise of her
constitutional right to an appeal merely
because of superficial deficiencies in the
brief prepared by her attorney.
1. See also Utah R.App P 24(a)(9) ('The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons
of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, with citations to the authorities, stat
ues, and parts of the record relied on "), State v.

That point having been made, I hasten to
add this is not such an instance I found it
impossible to glean from her brief what
appellant's basic contentions are on appeal.
Insofar as it is true that her complaint is
about the legality of certain searches,
where she takes no issue with the court's
findings (something she could not, as a
practical matter, do without a transcript)
there is little we can do. If the findings
were inadequate, we would remand for adequate findings. See, e.g., State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App.1990).
If the findings supported only a legal conclusion that the searches, or one of them,
was illegal, we would reverse. See, e.g.,
State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341 (Utah App.
1991). Neither scenario seems present
here and nothing in appellant's brief serves
to convince me otherwise.
One other point merits comment The
problems attending an inadequate brief can
sometimes be ameliorated with a helpful
presentation at oral argument See, e.g.,
Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960,
962 n. 6 (Utah App.1988), cert denied,
Rone v. Demetropoulos, 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988). In this case, under circumstances which inspire little confidence, we
had the benefit of oral argument only by
counsel for the State. As counsel's cavalier attitude concerning this court's calendaring requirements is not unique, I want to
take the occasion to point up the argument
protocol the judges of this court expect.
The protocol is premised on the notion that
appellate argument is a rather significant
event in the life of an attorney.
Upon receipt of notice of argument,
counsel should immediately check his or
her calendar. Existing conflicts should ordinarily give way to the scheduled argument Attendance at the Court of Appeals
is a sufficient excuse for changing most
depositions and meetings. A narrow range
of existing conflicts may warrant a change
of time for the appellate argument as
scheduled, at least if a partner or associate
can not capably make the argument A
Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1352 (Utah App 1991);
Chnstensen v Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Utah
App 1991), Koults v Standard Oil Co of Cat,
746 P2d 1182, 1184-85 (Utah App 1987)
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first place trial setting in a case that will
not be settled, a long-planned vacation
where non-refundable arrangements have
been made, and scheduled medical or surgical procedures may be examples. However, to minimize disruption for opposing
counsel as well as the court, a motion requesting a continuance and setting forth
the problem in some detail should be filed
within a few days of receipt of the notice—
not within a few days prior to argument
Once argument has been set, one simply
does not permit inconsistent obligations to
come into existence thereafter. There are
few reasons for avoiding the setting of
depositions, trials, or hearings better than
"I am scheduled at the Court of Appeals
that morning."
Unless a well-supported motion to continue has been filed within a few days of

receipt of our notice of argument, or argument is formally waived, we simply expect
counsel to appear as scheduled unless an
actual emergency, not reasonably to have
been anticipated, arises and is brought to
our attention as promptly as possible. If
argument has not been previously waived
as a matter of informed judgment, we assume the case merits argument, in which
event it is simply unprofessional to just be
a "no-show" even if a legitimate emergency has arisen.
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